|Statement||by the Comptroller General of the United States.|
|LC Classifications||KF1652 .U48|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||iv, 129 p. :|
|Number of Pages||129|
|LC Control Number||80601266|
European regulators are poised for aggressive enforcement of antitrust laws and the potential for civil liability in the U.S. is a real risk for big data companies. It appears that, in addition to privacy liability, data businesses must also prepare for increased scrutiny of . In describing big data, people often refer to the “three Vs” – volume, velocity, and variety. 2. The volume and variety of data stem in part from the ubiquitous collection and compilation of smaller data – a tap of a smartphone, a website login, or a movement collected by a shopping center sensor, to cite a few examples. The Case for Antitrust Enforcement Jonathan B. Baker T he U.S. Supreme Court has awarded the antitrust statutes near-constitutional status, describing them as the “Magna Carta of free enter-prise” and “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our. In the era of global antitrust cartel enforcement, antitrust practitioners often scratch their collective heads and ask why is antitrust compliance so ignored by government enforcement agencies. Instead of promoting antitrust compliance programs by offering real and meaningful incentives, antitrust enforcement agencies offer no carrots to companies to enhance their antitrust .
MANAGING ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE THROUGH THE CONTINUING SURGE IN GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT ABBOTT B. LIPSKY, JR.* I. INTRODUCTION Antitrust1 law enforcement is continuing its forceful expansion and intensification around the world. From its . Many have focused on whether Big Data even presents an antitrust issue, and whether and how harms resulting from Big Data should be analyzed and remedied under the antitrust laws. The academic literature, however, has somewhat lagged behind the policy debate, and a closer inspection of existing scholarly works reveals a dearth of thorough study Cited by: 1. 76 St. John’s L. Rev. , () (by end of s, U.S. antitrust enforcement “stopped careening fromaggressive enforcement based insome part on apopulist ideology to minimalist enforcement based on hostility to the core assumptions of antitrust”). 8 By this logic, some observers warned in that the DOJ and the FTC under George. Wright: Antitrust’s rule of reason was designed precisely for this and has been around a long can get at harms to price, output, and innovation. So whether the harm alleged is standard.
Best Practices For Managing Data In Antitrust Cases the historical data relevant for the case and the burden and the resources needed to collect and extract these files. Because there are few people at the company that are knowledgeable of the decommissioned systems, other sources of information will be important to make an assessment. Data debate,22 antitrust agencies and the courts have not found a Big Data competition problem. In fact, the FTC and DG Competition have thor-oughly considered Big Data as an antitrust problem and completely dis-missed it The antitrust authorities in the United States, at DG Competition 15 Id. at –Cited by: 1. GOALS OF ANTITRUST rectly when it prohibits cartels and monopolies in the single-minded pursuit of efficiency. Antitrust actions may not always improve both income dis-tribution and efficiency. For example, the break-up of a cartel of artist-merchants who . First, we need to enhance international antitrust enforcement. That would have been a new, and perhaps surprising, concept just twenty years ago, when we could afford to be more parochial in our thinking. However, the world is now more open to international trade.